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I. Introduction
Investing in education increases economic growth and, at the individual level,
raises incomes and living standards (Krueger and Lindahl 2001). Develop-
ing countries have achieved substantial increases in primary and secondary en-
rolment rates in the last 25 years (Glewwe et al. 2013), yet students in many
developing countries learn much less than students in developed countries
(Glewwe and Kremer 2006). Equally disturbing is that, within developing
countries, some children learn much more than others, and in some countries
schools appear to widen learning gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged
students (Banerjee and Duﬂo 2011). While eliminating inequality in student
learning is probably impossible, theremay be scope for reducing within-country
learning gaps by implementing education policies that disproportionately ben-
eﬁt disadvantaged students.
The existing literature on learning gaps focuses on whether disadvantaged
students attend lower quality schools (McEwan 2004; McEwan and Trow-
bridge 2007). Yet recent evidence (reviewed below) ﬁnds large learning differ-
ences between children of different backgrounds even within the same schools.
This article uses panel data fromVietnamandPeru to investigate intraschool dif-
ferences in learning. It uses six different advantage indicators to assess whether
advantaged students learn more than disadvantaged students when they at-
tend the same school. Comparison of Vietnam and Peru is of particular inter-
est given their starkly different scores on the 2012 Program for International
Student Assessment (PISA; OECD 2013); of the 65 countries assessed, Viet-Electronically published May 24, 2017
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700 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Enam ranked seventeenth in mathematics and nineteenth in reading (ahead of
the United States and the United Kingdom), while Peru ranked last (sixty-ﬁfth)
in both subjects. This difference is particularly striking given that Peru’s income
per capita in 2012 ($6,060) was four times larger than Vietnam’s ($1,550;
World Bank 2013).
More speciﬁcally, this article estimates the combined impacts of all school
and teacher characteristics on student learning by estimating separate ﬁxed ef-
fects for advantaged and disadvantaged students in each school. For each coun-
try, the relative sizes of the two ﬁxed effects are compared for six types of ad-
vantage (being wealthy, having higher skills at age 5, being male, being from
the ethnic majority group [Peru only], higher maternal education, and better
nutrition in early childhood) to examine whether advantaged children learn
more than otherwise comparable disadvantaged children in the same schools.
This article advances knowledge on student learning in developing coun-
tries in three ways. First, the rich data set, which links detailed individual-level
panel data from early childhood to very detailed school surveys, reduces omitted-
variable bias. Second, separate school ﬁxed effects for advantaged and disadvan-
taged children allow for within-school heterogeneity in the impact of school
and teacher variables on learning, which is usually ignored in the literature but
may be an important driver of inequality. Third, using very similar data for
two very different countries allows for cross-country heterogeneity in whether
schools raise or lower student learning gaps.
The article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature.
Section III describes the Vietnam and Peru school systems, and Section IV
presents the methodology. The next three sections describe the data, discuss
estimation issues, and present results, respectively. SectionVIII provides robust-
ness checks and an extension to the analysis. Section IX concludes.
II. Literature Review
Gaps in education outcomes between children from more and less socioeco-
nomically advantaged backgrounds are widely documented. Filmer and Pritch-
ett (1999) use data from 35 developing countries to show that most shortfalls
in basic education indicators (e.g., enrollment and dropout) are due to children
in the bottom 40% of the wealth distribution. Indeed, the link between so-
cioeconomic background and schooling has been found in both countries ex-
amined in this article: Vietnam (Glewwe and Jacoby 2004) and Peru ( Jacoby
1994).
A large literature considers why children from advantaged backgrounds have
better educational outcomes. This literature focuses mainly on differences at
home and in school, which can affect learning through many mechanisms, in-This content downloaded from 128.041.061.025 on July 07, 2017 06:51:37 AM
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titudes toward education, and children’s learning capacity, which may be re-
duced by their exposure to adversity (Duncan and Murnane 2011).
Home factors that seem to matter include income, parental education, and
early childhood nutrition (Glewwe and Miguel 2008; Behrman 2010; Alder-
man and Bleakley 2013). There is evidence that school and teacher quality af-
fect education outcomes in many contexts (Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander
2007; Altonji and Mansﬁeld 2011; Lai, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2011), yet
the available evidence is inconclusive on exactly what constitutes school qual-
ity. Glewwe et al. (2013), reviewing 20 years of studies on developing coun-
tries, conclude that much of what matters is unlikely to be easy to observe.
More recent work suggests that teacher behaviors collectively described as “re-
sponsive teaching” (Hamre et al. 2014) are strongly associated with increased
learning (Araujo et al. 2016).
Whatever school quality is, the literature ﬁnds that access to it varies by
children’s socioeconomic background, and this explains much of the differences
in their educational outcomes. For example, UK andUS studies ﬁnd that learn-
ing gaps between more and less advantaged children widen during their time in
school and that differences in school quality explain part of this trend (Currie
and Thomas 2001; Fryer and Levitt 2004). There is also developing country
evidence: two recent studies ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant portion (e.g., 50%–69% in
Guatemala) of the learning gap between indigenous and nonindigenous chil-
dren is due to differences in school quality in Latin American countries (Mc-
Ewan 2004; McEwan and Trowbridge 2007).
Much of the literature focuses on differences between schools attended by
advantaged and disadvantaged children. Our article adds to a smaller literature
on within-school differences in learning between children of different back-
grounds. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2011) suggest that this leads to inequality in ed-
ucational outcomes in many developing countries. We know of no studies that
directly examine the effect of within-school differences in the educational ex-
periences of children from different backgrounds on learning gaps, yet there
is evidence of within-school differences in treatment of children of different
backgrounds that is consistent with such an effect.
For example, Hanna and Linden (2012) randomly assigned child charac-
teristics (gender, age, and caste) to cover sheets of pupil exams in India. Teach-
ers recruited to grade those exams, who could see the characteristics from the
sheets, gave low-caste children lower scores. Botelho, Madeira, and Rangel
(2015) found similar discrimination by race in Brazil. In the United States,
Dee (2005) showed that racial and ethnic distance between teachers and pu-
pils affects teachers’ perceptions of pupil performance, especially of disadvan-This content downloaded from 128.041.061.025 on July 07, 2017 06:51:37 AM
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formance via “stereotype” threat. Hoff and Pandey (2006) show that a caste
gap emerges in India when school-age task participants’ caste is revealed. This
supports the emphasis on identity by Akerlof and Kranton (2010), who ar-
gue that within a school the dominant group’s norms can reduce the per-
formance of “outsiders.” These ﬁndings motivate our focus on within-school
differences in learning among children from advantaged and disadvantaged
backgrounds.
III. Overview of the School Systems in Vietnam and Peru
The education systems of Vietnam and Peru provide an interesting contrast.
Enrollment has increased in both countries, but Vietnam’s expansion has been
much more equitable.
Primary school has long been compulsory in both countries. In Vietnam, the
1991 Law on Universal Primary Education made primary education (grades 1–
5) compulsory for 6–14-year-old children. Universal primary education was es-
sentially achieved by 2010, with a net enrollment rate of 98% (World Bank
2012). Peru’s 2003General Education Law also stipulated compulsory basic ed-
ucation, and its net enrollment rate was 95% in 2010 (World Bank 2012).
Education quality is a focus in both counties. Vietnam has invested heavily
in primary school facilities, teacher training, and curricular and textbook re-
form and raised hours per day in primary school, which were relatively low.
Vietnam’s high rank in the 2012 PISA tests suggests that its efforts succeeded
in raising school quality; Peru’s PISA results indicate less success.
Evidence also suggests large inequities in educational provision in both coun-
tries. Vietnam has introduced several new programs to ensure “minimum stan-
dards” of quality to all, especially in disadvantaged areas (World Bank 2004;
UNESCO 2011). Although concern remains in Vietnam about growing in-
equity (World Bank 2011), comparisons with other developing countries sug-
gest that Vietnam’s educational outcomes are quite equitably distributed (Hol-
singer 2005). In contrast, in Peru there are large gaps in pupils’ educational
outcomes by socioeconomic group, ethnicity, and location (Murray 2012). In-
deed, Peru had the largest ratio of performance at the 95th percentile over per-
formance at the 5th percentile of all 43 countries participating in the 2000 PISA
assessment (Crouch, Gustafsson, and Lavado 2009).
These differences between Vietnam and Peru suggest that their education
systems have different effects on learning gaps between advantaged and disad-
vantaged students. We use comparable data to examine these effects for a rela-
tively high-performing, and equitable, education system (Vietnam) and a more
unequal, less well performing system (Peru).This content downloaded from 128.041.061.025 on July 07, 2017 06:51:37 AM
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This article examines whether the impact of school characteristics on learning
differs within schools between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils. This sec-
tion presents the equations to be estimated. Data and estimation strategy are
then discussed in Sections V and VI.
To begin, consider a linear approximation of a general production function
for cognitive skills (C) of primary school students:
C 5 b0 1 b1Cp 1 b2Np 1 b3N 1 b4PE 1 b5PT
1 b6EI3 1 b7IA 1 c1
0SC 1 c20TC 1 u: (1)
In this equation, Cp is “preschool” cognitive skills (skills when starting primary
school at age 5); Np is “preschool” nutritional status (nutrition from birth to
age 5); N is current nutritional status; PE is parental education; PT is parental
time spent with the child during primary school on activities that raise cogni-
tive skills; EI is purchased educational inputs such as textbooks, school sup-
plies, and tutoring; IA is the child’s innate ability; and SC and TC are vectors
of school and teacher characteristics, repectively. The residual, u, accounts for
errors due to the linear approximation and measurement errors in S and is as-
sumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
Equation (1) assumes linear separability between household/child character-
istics and teacher/school characteristics; interactions between household and
child variables and school and teacher variables are assumed to be negligible.
This is a strong assumption, yet studies of student learning in developed and
developing countries often invoke it (e.g., Rockoff 2004; Chay, McEwan, and
Urquiola 2005; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; Rothstein 2010). We will
relax this assumption by allowing the effects of teacher/school variables to differ
across advantaged and disadvantaged students.
Glewwe et al. (2013) explain how difﬁcult it is to estimate the impacts of
school and teacher characteristics on student learning. Fortunately, for themain
objective of this article—to assess whether schools reinforce or reduce learn-
ing gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged students—one can simply use
a summary measure of school quality that captures both easy and difﬁcult (if
not impossible) to measure school and teacher characteristics. More speciﬁcally,
one can combine the impacts of school and teacher variables in equation (1)
into school ﬁxed effects:
C 5 b1Cp 1 b2Np 1 b3N 1 b4PE 1 b5PT
1 b6EI 1 b7IA 1o
S
s51
dsDs 1 u, (2)
(1)
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704 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ewhere ds5 b01 g10SCs1 g20TCs, and Ds is a dummy variable for school s. Note
that each ds includes b0; one can estimate only the relative, not the absolute, im-
pact of each school on student learning. Two notable features of equation (2) are
that (i) no restrictions were imposed on (1) to obtain (2)—the latter simply con-
verts each school’s g10SC1 g20TC term into a school ﬁxed effect—and (ii) these
ﬁxed effects include all possible interactions between the SC and TC variables.
The disadvantage of estimating (2) instead of (1) is that (2) does not reveal
which school characteristics increase student learning. Yet the advantage is that
the ﬁxed effect captures both observed and unobserved school variables that
affect learning and so can be used to assess the role of school (and teacher) char-
acteristics in explaining that outcome. This method has been used to study both
school and teacher quality (Rockoff 2004; Rivkin et al. 2005; Aaronson et al.
2007).1
To date, studies that use school ﬁxed effects assume that there are no inter-
actions between (observed or unobserved) school variables and student and
household variables. Thus, this method assumes that within schools all stu-
dents beneﬁt equally from what schools offer regardless of student character-
istics. To our knowledge, this assumption has never been relaxed. Yet the ev-
idence discussed in Section II of differential performance among students in
the same schools because of caste or race discrimination, or the effects of ste-
reotype threat, belies this assumption.
One way to allow the impacts of school and teacher characteristics to differ
among students in the same school is to divide students in each school into two
or more groups and allow each group to have a distinct school ﬁxed effect. In
particular, if students can be classiﬁed as “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” one
can rewrite (2) as
C5b0X 1o
S
s51
ksDs 1o
S
s51
vsDs A 1 u3, (3)
where A is a dummy variable indicating “advantaged” students and, to reduce
clutter, b0X denotes b1Cp1 b2Np1 b3N1 b4PE1 b5PT1 b6EI1 b7IA. The
ks term measures the impact of school s on disadvantaged students, and ks1 vs
measures its impact on advantaged students. If schools affect the learning of
both types of students equally, then vs 5 0. The goal of this article is to test
whether the value of vs, averaged across the schools in the sample, is equal to
zero.1 Note that, unlike Aaronson et al. (2007), our goal is not to estimate the variance of the distribution
of school ﬁxed effects; instead, it is to estimate the mean of a particular type of school ﬁxed effect.
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skills at school starting age, being male,2 belonging to the dominant ethnic
group,3 having an educated mother, and adequate nutrition in early childhood.
How they are measured is discussed in the next section.
To clarify what we intend to estimate, consider the ideal “experiment” that
would yield such an estimate. Assume that students are randomly “labeled” as
advantaged or disadvantaged conditional on their values of X. These labels may
be correlated with some X variables—for example, wealthy parents may help
their children more with schoolwork (an X variable)—but conditional on X
the labels are randomly assigned and so do not predict student performance un-
less teachers or schools, intentionally or unintentionally, are more effective for
students with a particular label. If no differential effectiveness exists, estimated
school ﬁxed effects conditional on X will not differ between students randomly
labeled as advantaged or disadvantaged: vs should be 0. Yet if differential effec-
tiveness does exist, estimated school ﬁxed effects conditional on X will differ
across advantaged and disadvantaged students: vs ≠ 0.
This “experiment” closely resembles that of Hanna and Linden (2012), yet
our data are not from a randomized controlled trial. Hanna and Linden were
able to randomize only favoritism in grading exams, not favoritism, or more
generally differential effectiveness, in daily classroom interactions with students,
and it would be very difﬁcult to randomize labeling to detect this more general
differential effectiveness. While we cannot use a randomized controlled trial to
investigate such general favoritism, an advantage we have is unusually detailed
data that allow us to control for a wide variety of student and household vari-
ables, including cognitive skills at age 5 (before starting school), which could
account for many difﬁcult to measure factors such as innate ability (IA) and
many types of parental time (PT) and educational inputs (EI).
V. Data
This section presents the data we use and discusses the deﬁnitions of advantage.
A. Survey and Sampling
This article uses data from Young Lives, a multicountry longitudinal study of
child poverty in four developing countries: Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Viet-2 While some evidence suggests that girls outperform boys in reading (e.g., Guiso et al. 2008), other
studies (e.g., Fryer and Levitt 2010) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, persistent gender gap favoring boys in math in
both developed and developing countries. However, there is little evidence, at least in the United
States, of a gender gap before starting school.
3 We use this deﬁnition only for Peru, as only 8% of the Vietnam school survey subsample are ethnic
minorities.
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706 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Enam. Each country collects data on two cohorts of children: 1,000 children
born in 1994–95 and 2,000 born in 2000–2001. Our study uses data only
from the latter cohort, known as the “younger cohort.” In each country, the
2,000 younger cohort children were sampled by randomly selecting 100 chil-
dren who were 6–18 months old in 2001–2 from each of 20 sites. The data
are statistically representative of the site level populations but are not nation-
ally representative. However, the 20 sites in each country were purposively se-
lected to represent each country’s socioeconomic and geographic diversity (ex-
cept for the wealthiest areas).
Three rounds of household-level data were collected in 2002, 2006–7, and
2009. School-level data were collected in 2011 for subsamples of the younger
cohort children.4 The 2011 school surveys differ somewhat by country, reﬂect-
ing differences in school systems and policies. This study uses both the house-
hold and school survey data, focusing on Peru and Vietnam because of the
availability of recently collected school survey data.5
The Vietnam school survey was conducted in October 2011, in all 20 sites.
The school survey subsample, the focus of this article, consists of all younger
cohort children enrolled in grade 5 (the appropriate grade for their age) in the
2011–12 school year; all schools attended by these children were surveyed. This
subsample consists of 1,138 children in 92 primary schools.
The Peru school survey was conducted from October to December 2011.
Thesamplingwas stratiﬁed,with four school typesas strata sothateachtype—pri-
vate urban, public urban, public rural bilingual, and public rural nonbilingual
(Spanish only)—is represented. A random subsample was drawn of younger co-
hort children in each of these four school types. The school sample consists of
these children’s schools; all younger cohort children in themwere surveyed.This
subsample has 572 children in 132 schools. Most were in grade 4 (59%), while
32%were in grade 5, and 9% in grade 3. After dropping a few observations with
missing data, theﬁnal samples are 547 children in 132 schools inPeru and1,129
children in 90 schools in Vietnam.
B. Testing
Child learning is measured using scores on curriculum-based math and read-
ing comprehension tests administered as part of the school surveys. In Viet-4 In 2011, these children were about 10 years old. They typically started primary school in 2006.
Note that a fourth round of data was collected in 2013 and has just become available; this round
was not available when this article was written.
5 School data were not available for Ethiopia when this analysis was done; school data were available
for India but because of the large number of small schools attended by the younger cohort children,
the data are not well suited to identifying school ﬁxed effects.
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ulum; they are similar to the Ministry of Education’s grade 5 assessment tests
(World Bank 2011). In Peru, grade-speciﬁc math and reading tests with 30–
35 items were developed by GRADE (Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo),
a Peruvian research institute, to reﬂect the curricula in grades 3–5.6 The tests
were designed to reﬂect each country’s curriculum and so are not comparable
across countries.7
We also use twomeasures of cognitive ability from assessments administered
when the children were age 5. These are the Cognitive Development Assess-
ment (CDA) and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT). Both tests have
been validated in many contexts and are highly correlated with broad-based IQ
measures (Cueto et al. 2009).
The CDAwas developed by the International Evaluation Association to as-
sess the cognitive development of 4-year-old children. The subscale adminis-
tered to theYoungLives children assesses perceptions of quantity by testing chil-
dren’s understanding of concepts such as few, most, half, many, equal, and pair
with statements such as “Point to the plate that has few cupcakes.” The sub-
scale has 15 items, and each correct answer is scored as 1 point, so that the min-
imum number of points a child can get is 0 and the maximum is 15.
The PPVT is a test of child receptive vocabulary, which measures vocabu-
lary acquisition.8 The test taker is asked to select the picture that best repre-
sents the meaning of a stimulus word presented orally by the examiner. Test
items were arranged in order of increasing difﬁculty, and only the items within
the critical range of the speciﬁc child were administered to each child, as de-
termined by a well-deﬁned procedure followed by the interviewer. The test
score is calculated as the difference between the ceiling item (e.g., word num-
ber 78) and the total number of errors. Ofﬁcial test manuals include tables for
standardization of the raw scores. However, these standardization procedures
were not followed within the Young Lives study, as the standardization samples
have characteristics different from the Young Lives samples.96 The English versions of the complete set of tests and questionnaires used in the Vietnam and Peru
school surveys are available on the Young Lives website: http://www.younglives.org.uk/content
/school-survey.
7 The curriculum itself can induce gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged students; we assess
whether the entire school system generates such gaps and leave to future research which aspects of
the systems produce any gaps we ﬁnd.
8 Speciﬁcally, the versions administered in Peru and Vietnam were the Spanish version of the PPVT-R
(Dunn et al. 1986) and a translation into Vietnamese of the PPVT-III (Dunn and Dunn 1997), respec-
tively. Both versions measure the same underlying construct and follow the same principle, although the
PPVT-R has fewer items than the PPVT-III (125 and 204, respectively).
9 For a more detailed description of the CDA and PPVT tests administered within Young Lives, see
Cueto et al. (2009).
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708 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EThe scores for all of the tests that we use in the analysis were generated us-
ing Item Response Theory (IRT) models. IRT has a long history in education
and psychometrics. For instance, it is applied to generate internationally com-
parable scores for tests such as PISA and TIMSS (Trends in International
Mathematics and Science Study), but it is still not widely applied in econom-
ics. The main reason that we use IRT in this article is that it offers a less arbi-
trary way to construct the skill measure than, for instance, summing up correct
responses. Further, it offers a way to construct comparable measures across
grades.10 IRT studies tests at the item (test question) level, modeling the prob-
ability that an individuals with given ability will correctly answer an item. The
overall estimate of this ability is generated by analyzing an individual’s response
to many different items, each deﬁned by their own characteristics. The esti-
mate of the ability parameter maximizes the posterior probability of a person’s
whole set of responses. See Das and Zajonc (2010) for further details.
C. Advantage
The ﬁrst of the six advantage categories used in this article is being wealthy,
deﬁned as living in a household in the top two wealth quintiles of a wealth in-
dex that combines measures of housing quality, ownership of consumer dura-
bles, and access to key services.11 Having high skills at school starting age, the
second advantage category, is deﬁned as performing in the top 40% on the
CDA test, whichmeasures children’s basic quantitative skills at age 5 (the school
starting age in both countries is 6). Robustness checks in Section VIII show that
the main ﬁndings hold if other cutoff points are used for the wealth and skill
advantage classiﬁcations.
Being male is the third advantage type. The fourth, ethnicity, is used only
for Peru; only 8% of the sample in the Vietnam school survey are ethnic mi-10 This is particularly relevant for Peru, where the school survey sample includes children from mul-
tiple grades. The tests for children in different grades were designed to have common items that are
used to create scores that are comparable across grades using IRT.
11 We use the wealth index constructed and publicly archived by the Young Lives team. It draws on
work undertaken by the World Bank and Macro International. It is a simple average of three separate
indexes that range from 0 to 1: housing quality, consumer durables, and access to services. The hous-
ing quality index is a mean of (1) rooms per person (number of rooms divided by number of house-
hold members), set to take a maximum value of 1; (2) ﬂoor quality (a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the ﬂoor is made of ﬁnished material); and (3) roof quality (a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the roof is made of iron, concrete tiles, or slate. The consumer durables index is the
proportion of durables a household owns from a list of seven (radio, motorbike/scooter, bicycle, TV,
motorized vehicle or truck, landline telephone, and modern bed or a table). The services index is the
proportion of key services that a household has access to: electricity, piped water, own pit latrine/ﬂush
toilet, and modern cooking fuel (gas, kerosene, or electricity).
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Glewwe, Krutikova, and Rolleston 709norities.12 Ethnicity is a sensitive issue in Peru. Thus, in the Young Lives sample
the great majority of mothers identify their children as mestizo.13 For the pur-
pose of identifying disadvantage, a more accurate deﬁnition of ethnicity is the
mother’s ﬁrst language; it is an ethnicity marker and so is associated with exclu-
sion in Peru (Escobal, Saavedra, and Vakis 2012). Thus, children are classed
as being an ethnic minority if their mother’s ﬁrst language is not Spanish (but
rather Quechua, Aymara, or another indigenous language).
The last two deﬁnitions of advantage are having an educated mother and
adequate nutrition in infancy. The former is deﬁned as having a mother who
completed at least primary school. The latter is deﬁned as not being stunted,
that is, having a height-for-age z-score greater than 22, at age 1.
While these types of advantage are correlated, they overlap only partially (see
appendix tables A1 and A2). Table 1 shows that they represent advantage in
terms of skill acquisition; for all six types, the advantaged group almost always
has signiﬁcantly higher scores on cognitive tests (the CDA and the PPVT, both
described above) taken at age 5, before the children started school, suggesting
that advantaged children enjoy favorable conditions for acquiring skills before
starting primary school. Of course, these are unconditional means, and so some
of these differences may not persist after conditioning on other variables.
Equation (3) can be estimated only for schools with at least one advantaged
child and at least one disadvantaged child in our sample. Thus, the estimation
samples vary by the deﬁnition of advantage; table A3 shows the number of
observations and schools in each of these estimation samples.14 In the Vietnam
sample, of the 90 schools, 82 are attended by two or more sample children. Of
these 82, 48 have sample children from both the poorer and the richer groups,
61 include both more able and less able children, 77 have both boys and girls,
61 have children with both more and less educated mothers, and 63 have chil-
dren who were and were not malnourished at age 1. Of the 132 schools in
Peru, 80 have two or more sample children. Of these 80, 36 have both richer
and poorer children, 47 have both more able and less able children, 63 have
both boys and girls, 25 have both ethnicminority and ethnicmajority children,
48 have children with both more educated and less educated mothers, and 5412 Ethnicity is not used as an advantage category for Vietnam, yet a variable indicating an ethnic ma-
jority group child is used as a control in the estimations. It is deﬁned as being Kinh (i.e., not H’mong,
Dao, Tay, or other).
13 Meaning a person of combined European and indigenous descent.
14 Perhaps the precision of estimates for the nonschool variables would be higher, and bias in the
school effects lower, if we used the whole sample (not just the “overlap” subsample of schools that
have at least one advantaged child and one disadvantaged child), still estimating the school effects
only for the “overlap” subsample. Yet the estimates of differences in school effects change little when
the whole sample is used (results available on request).
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710 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ehave children who were and were not stunted at age 1. Limiting the analysis to
schools with both advantaged and disadvantaged sample children raises issues
of selection bias in the estimates of vs; we return to this issue in Section VIII.
VI. Estimation
Equation (3) is estimated using Young Lives’ child, parent, and household char-
acteristics data. Skills acquired before entering primary school (Cp) are mea-
sured by scores on theCDA and PPVT tests in round 2, when the children were
5 years old. Both tests have been validated in many contexts and are highly cor-
related with broad-based IQ measures, which suggests that they can also serve
as controls for innate ability (IA). Nutritional status before entering school (Np)
is measured by maternal assessments of the child’s size at birth (ﬁve-point scale,
very small to very large) and of the child’s health at age 1 relative to that of other
children, as well as the height-for-age z-score measured at age 5 (in round 2).
Current nutritional status (N ) could, in principle, be measured by the height-
for-age z-score in round 3, but it is highly correlated with round 2 height for
age (0.80 for Vietnam, 0.79 for Peru), so it is excluded.
Parental education (PE) in equation (3) is measured by dummy variables for
different levels of education, separately for mothers and fathers, with no edu-TABLE 1
DIFFERENCE IN PRESCHOOL TEST SCORES BETWEEN MORE AND LESS ADVANTAGED CHILDREN
(ADVANTAGED 2 DISADVANTAGED)
Vietnam Peru
PPVT CDA PPVT CDA
Advantage Category (1) (2) (3) (4)
Being richer (top 2 wealth quintiles) 21.89*** 13.29*** 24.80*** 30.94***
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) 30.06*** 77.35*** 11.23*** 76.39***
Being male 5.99** 4.13* 22.29 21.92
Being an ethnic majority NA NA 21.17*** 15.19***
Having a mother with at least completed primary schooling 16.68*** 6.33* 22.81*** 18.17***
Having not been malnourished in infancy 10.74*** 2.82 13.91*** 2.53This content downloaded from 128.041.06
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w.journals.uNote. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) is a measure of receptive vocabulary. The Cognitive
Development Assessment (CDA) measures children’s perceptions of quantity—testing understanding of
concepts such as few, most, half, many, equal, and pair. The difference in CDA scores between more
and less able children is there by construction since being more able is deﬁned as having a CDA score
in the top two quintiles of the distribution at age 5. Being richer: wealth quintiles are constructed using
a wealth index that is a simple average of three individual indexes ranging from 0 to 1, including housing
quality (rooms per person, ﬂoor and roof quality), consumer durables (mean of ownership of radio, bicycle,
TV, car/truck, motorbike/scooter, landline telephone, bed/table), and access to services (electricity; piped
water into dwelling/yard; access to own pit latrine/ﬂush toilet; cooking fuel is electricity, gas, or kerosene).
Being an ethnic majority: Peru—mother’s ﬁrst language is Spanish (i.e., not Quechua, Aymara, or other).
Not being malnourished in infancy: deﬁned using anthropometric indicator of adequate long-term growth
(height-for-age z-scores > 22).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01. AM
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Glewwe, Krutikova, and Rolleston 711cation as the base category. Parental time with the child (PT) is measured by a
dummy variable indicating whether someone outside the household cared for
the child (including attending a crèche) in round 1 (when the child was about
1 year old), the mother’s mental health in round 1,15 a dummy variable for
whether the child is an only child, and household size. Educational inputs (EI)
are measured by time in preschool and several asset variables (the wealth index,
land owned, and per capita consumption) that should be highly correlated with
unobserved educational inputs.16
A few control variables are also added to equation (3): age when the test was
taken and dummy variables for being in grades 3 and 4 (Peru only), for ethnic
minority, and for being male. Finally, school identiﬁers from the school survey
are used to generate school ﬁxed effects; these are interacted with the relevant
advantage dummy variable to estimate vs.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all these variables. The children were
about 10 years old when they took the math and verbal tests used as outcome
measures. Almost all test scores were transformed using a three-parameter IRT
model, with means and standard deviations standardized to 500 and 100, re-
spectively.17 The exception is that the CDA and PPVTscores were standardized
(on the full Young Lives sample) to have means of 300 and standard deviations
of 50. Finally, child nutrition is measured by height-for-age z-scores using
WHO standards.
A number of estimation issues require further discussion. First, recall from
Section IV the “thought experiment” underlying our analysis. It is straightfor-
wardwhen disadvantage is deﬁned as ethnicity or gender: conditional onX, eth-
nicity and gender should be considered as randomly assigned labels that have
no predictive power for educational outcomes unless teachers or schools, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, are differentially effective for students with those
labels. Even if girls tend to have better language skills, and boys better math
skills, after controlling for skills at age 5 there should be little difference in the
learning of boys and girls.1815 Maternal mental health is measured using the Self-Reporting Questionnaire; see the table 2 note
for details.
16 This means that (2) and (3) are no longer “pure” production functions as other explanatory var-
iables, such as child ability, may also affect educational input purchases. But this will have little effect
on estimated school ﬁxed effects.
17 The scores and standard deviations in table 2 are not exactly 500 and 100, respectively, as the stan-
dardization was done for the whole school survey sample, including school peers.
18 In fact, differences in cognitive skills by gender at age 5 are small in Vietnam and insigniﬁcant in
Peru; see table 1. For Peru, once we condition on income, nutritional status, parental education, and
preschool attendance, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in test scores by ethnicity at age 5.
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TABLE 2
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Vietnam Peru
Mean SD Mean SD
From school survey:
Mathematics test score (IRT transformed;
whole sample mean 5 500, SD 5 100) 499.19 96.48 508.60 102.65
Language test score (IRT transformed; whole
sample mean 5 500, SD 5 100) 497.44 96.69 505.77 99.69
Age in months at the time of the test 123.24 2.71 122.16 3.87
From household survey (time-invariant variables):
Male (dummy) .51 .50 .48 .50
Ethnic minority (dummy) .08 .27 .36 .48
Father: years of schooling 7.69 3.53 9.23 3.77
Mother: years of schooling 7.17 3.30 7.84 3.11
Measured during infancy (round 1):
Birth size (maternal assessment: 1 5 very large
to 5 5 very small) 3.08 .66 3.11 .96
Health better than other children (dummy,
maternal assessment) .26 .44 .41 .49
Childcare: cared for by people outside the
household /in crèche (dummy) .42 .49 .21 .41
Maternal mental health 4.4 4.02 5.78 4.26
Wealth index .47 .20 .43 .19
Measured at age 5 (round 2):
Height-for-age z-score 21.30 .97 21.53 1.02
PPVT Score (IRT transformed; whole sample
mean 5 300, SD 5 50) 305.33 44.33 301.34 44.84
CDA Score (IRT transformed; whole sample
mean 5 300, SD 5 50) 306.80 46.56 299.35 46.39
Time spent in preschool (hours per day in a
“normal” week) 5.79 2.45 3.44 1.83
Only child (dummy) .22 .42 .19 .40
Household size 4.57 1.39 5.52 2.23
Log per capita real consumption (in local
currency) 5.77 .54 5.02 .67
Area of land owned (in hectares) .42 1.07 1.09 3.34
Number of observations 1,129 547This content downloaded from 128.0
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w.journals.ucNote. Ethnicity minority status: Peru—mother’s ﬁrst language is not Spanish (i.e., is Quechua, Aymara, or
other); Vietnam—child reported by mother as not belonging to the Kinh group (i.e., is H’mong, Dao,
Tay, other). Maternal mental health is measured using the Self-Reporting Questionnaire (SRQ20), a screen-
ing tool for risk of common mental disorders (rCMD) developed by the World Health Organization for de-
veloping countries (Beusenberg and Orley 1994). It is a scale consisting of 20 statements with yes/no an-
swer options. The score reﬂects the number of yes responses out of possible 20; a higher score reﬂects
higher rCMD. Wealth index is a simple average of three individual indexes ranging from 0 to 1, including
housing quality (rooms per person, ﬂoor and roof quality), consumer durables (mean of ownership of radio,
bicycle, TV, car/truck, motorbike/scooter, landline telephone, bed/table), and access to services (electricity;
pipedwater intodwelling/yard; access toownpit latrine/ﬂush toilet; cooking fuel is electricity, gas, or kerosene).
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) measures receptive vocabulary. The Cognitive Development
Assessment (CDA) measures children’s perceptions of quantity—testing understanding of concepts such
as few, most, half, many, equal, and pair. IRT 5 Item Response Theory.M
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hold wealth; it should not directly affect learning after conditioning on pur-
chased educational inputs (EI),19 and so it should be excluded from X in equa-
tion (3), but a complication is that it is a continuous variable. Teachers or
schools may be more effective for wealthier students in two distinct ways: in-
creasing effectiveness that steadily rises with wealth, or a “sharp” increase in ef-
fectiveness (which could reﬂect intentional favoritism) that “turns on” when
wealth crosses a speciﬁc threshold. In the former case, the school ﬁxed effects
will vary continuously with wealth, so estimates of their difference when the
sample is divided roughly in half will estimate the differential effectiveness be-
tween an average advantaged student and an average disadvantaged student. In
the latter case, school ﬁxed effects take only two values in any given school, and
if the “jump” in differential effectiveness occurs near the middle of that vari-
able’s distribution one can estimate that jump. However, if the jump is in
one of the distribution’s tails it is difﬁcult to estimate because for most schools
the data will not have both advantaged and disadvantaged students.
A ﬁnal complication is when the advantage variable is both continuous and
directly affects learning, which occurs for three of our variables: skills at age 5,
parental education, and nutritional status.20 Such variables must be included in
X. If differential effectiveness that beneﬁts advantaged students gradually in-
creases as the advantage variable rises, it would be impossible to estimate such
differential effectiveness because it cannot be disentangled from that variable’s
direct effect on learning; the estimated school ﬁxed effects would not differ
across the two types of students. Yet if differential effectiveness takes the form
of a discrete jumpwhen a threshold is crossed, it can be identiﬁed if that thresh-
old is roughly in the middle (say, middle two quartiles) of that variable’s dis-
tribution and that variable’s direct impact on learning is smooth (does not
jump). To deﬁne advantage in terms of nutritional status, we use the standard
deﬁnition for not being stunted: a height for age z-score above 22; for the
other two variables, we deﬁne disadvantage so that about 60% of the sample
is advantaged.21
A second estimation issue is omitted-variable bias; any child and household
variables in equations (2) and (3) not in the data become part of the error term,19 Indeed we ﬁnd that controlling for purchased educational inputs, and for individual, parental, and
household factors in the production function, there is no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between
the wealth index and test scores at age 5 in either Peru or Vietnam.
20 If advantage were a dummy variable that directly affected learning, it would be impossible to es-
timate differential effectiveness because that X variable would be a linear combination of the advan-
taged students’ school ﬁxed effects.
21 For Peru, 60.8% are “more able,” 61.8% have better educated mothers, and 68.7% are not stunted.
The corresponding ﬁgures for Vietnam are 65.6%, 81.5%, and 78.1%.
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of all the coefﬁcients, including vs. More speciﬁcally, estimates of vs could in-
clude not only school ﬁxed effects that affect advantaged children only but also
general nonschool advantages those children have after controlling for other X
variables. Fortunately, the Young Lives data have detailed information dating
back to the students’ ﬁrst year of life; those data capture many, if not most,
of the nonschool advantages of being an advantaged child. In particular, X
has a comprehensive array of child and household variables, including con-
ditions in the ﬁrst year of life and the following 4 years before starting school,
and—most importantly—children’s cognitive skills before starting primary
school, which should account for the effect of omitted education inputs (EI)
and innate ability (IA) on C.22
If students sort into schools on the basis of unobserved traits—such as stu-
diousness or parental tastes for education—that directly affect learning and are
correlated with advantage indicators, such unobserved differences can be mis-
takenly interpreted as differential effectiveness that beneﬁts advantaged stu-
dents even if no such differential effectiveness exists. There is little school choice
in rural Vietnam, where most of the Vietnam sample children live; children are
assigned to schools on the basis of their residence, and rural areas typically have
only one primary school. Yet school choice is an option in Peru, where most of
the sample children live in urban areas and can enroll in other public schools;
also, and unlike Vietnam, many private schools are available. We cannot rule
out selection bias completely, but we expect that our extensive set of controls,
including cognitive skills at age 5, will capture most unobserved factors corre-
lated with school choice and test scores.
Omitted-variable bias concerns are also reduced because this article focuses
on differences between groups rather than level effects. Omitted variables will
bias estimates of vs only if they vary systematically across advantaged and dis-
advantaged children. Thus, our analysis is more robust than it would if we
estimated, say, the level effects of school inputs. We explore in Section VIII
the sensitivity of our estimates to omitted variables by comparing them to es-
timates based on stronger assumptions (cf. n. 22).
A third issue is that vs can be identiﬁed only for advantaged children who
attend schools with at least one disadvantaged child from the school survey
22 The estimated model is thus similar to the combined cumulative inputs value-added model favored
by Todd and Wolpin (2007). A pure cumulative inputs model includes only the history of inputs and
so assumes that observed inputs fully account for all inputs. In contrast, a value-added model includes
only current inputs and last period’s test score; it assumes that the lagged score fully captures endow-
ments and the effects of the complete history of inputs. In the mixed cumulative value-added model
that we estimate, identiﬁcation relies on a weaker assumption than either of these, that combined
lagged test scores and observed current and lagged inputs fully control for all past inputs.
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observable selection into schools with both types of children. This possibility is
also examined in Section VIII.
A fourth estimation concern is that while school ﬁxed effects are allowed
to vary across advantaged and disadvantaged children, coefﬁcients on child
and household variables are not. In fact, this appears to be plausible; tests
of whether those variables’ impacts varied by advantaged status rejected the
null of no difference in only 4 of 22 cases (see table A4).
Finally, some of the explanatory variables could be measured with error,
such as the Cp, N, and PT variables. In principle, we need instrumental var-
iables (IVs) for them, but ﬁnding valid IVs is a challenge. For this reason and
because we focus on the impact of school, not child or household, character-
istics on student learning, IV methods are not used to estimate equations (2)
and (3).
VII. Results
This section examines evidence on whether within-school differences in learn-
ing exist between advantaged and disadvantaged children. It begins by brieﬂy
discussing estimates of the effect of the nonschool determinants of math and
reading skills and then turns to estimates of the average value of vs, ﬁrst for
Vietnam and then for Peru, for each deﬁnition of advantage.
A. Nonschool Determinants of Learning
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2). It focuses on the estimates of non-
school determinants of school attainment (X variables), separately for math
and reading. Each school has only one school ﬁxed effect, which applies to
all pupils.23
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 show the results for Vietnam.The 1,129 students
in 90 schools include all younger cohort children in grade 5 in the 2011–12
school year. The coefﬁcients on both cognitive skill (at age 5) variables are pos-
itive and highly signiﬁcant. Several other variables are signiﬁcant. First, other
things equal, boys scored lower on both tests; the negative impact of being male
on math skills is modest,20.14 standard deviations, but the negative effect on
reading, 20.32 standard deviations, is fairly large. Larger negative effects are
seen for ethnic minority children; their math and reading scores are 0.38 and
0.47 standard deviations lower, respectively. Last, children of more educated
parents had signiﬁcantly higher scores on both tests.23 Estimates for eq. (3) are not shown as that requires six tables, one for each type of advantage. Es-
timates for the six versions of eq. (3) yield very similar results for the nonschool (child and household)
variables.
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TABLE 3
NONSCHOOL DETERMINANTS OF COGNITIVE SKILLS MEASURED BY 2011 SCHOOL SURVEY IN VIETNAM AND PERU
Vietnam Peru
Math Score Vietnamese Score Math Score Spanish Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPVT score (IRT transformed; whole
sample mean 5 300, SD 5 50) .292*** .401*** .185 .220***
(.077) (.089) (.116) (.083)
CDA score (IRT transformed; whole
sample mean 5 300, SD 5 50) .196*** .141** .208* .350***
(.070) (.063) (.108) (.107)
Age at the time of the test (months after
9 years old) 15.386 7.453 5.347 2.380
(9.291) (10.100) (6.709) (7.466)
Age2 at time of the test (months after
9 years old) 2.491 2.299 2.117 2.091
(.298) (.315) (.231) (.266)
In grade 3 at the time of the test . . . . . . 267.145*** 249.427**
(20.442) (21.127)
In grade 4 at the time of the test . . . . . . 217.014 212.007
(12.716) (12.716)
Ethnic minority (dummy) 238.259*** 247.172*** 27.563 212.705
(12.003) (14.335) (13.648) (12.239)
Male (dummy) 213.620** 231.796*** 5.290 28.140
(5.994) (4.434) (8.384) (8.353)
Father’s schooling: 4–6 years 1.670 11.129 23.214 2.415
(10.350) (9.047) (18.839) (17.371)
Father’s schooling: 7–9 years 6.978 17.339 14.176 215.180
(8.210) (10.915) (20.816) (19.545)
Father’s schooling: 101 years 22.141** 28.035** 19.520 13.971
(10.322) (12.147) (21.274) (17.805)
Mother’s schooling: 4–6 years 12.039 16.818* 7.236 8.746
(7.869) (9.376) (12.976) (11.407)
Mother’s schooling: 7–9 years 13.426* 20.135* 14.154 25.313**
(7.695) (10.641) (13.110) (10.217)
Mother’s schooling: 101 years 28.050** 35.351** 35.199*** 40.638***
(12.466) (15.004) (11.519) (10.489)
Birth size (maternal assessment: 1 5
very large to 5 5 very small) 21.608 1.639 2.513 22.573
(3.210) (3.855) (4.344) (5.111)
Health better than other children’s health
(dummy, maternal assessment) 21.699 24.625 4.676 6.382
(8.420) (6.687) (6.804) (8.766)
Childcare: looked after by others/in
crèche (dummy) 29.501* 210.996* 211.404 224.625***
(5.681) (5.576) (7.829) (8.718)
Maternal mental health 21.276* 21.065 2.057 2.018**
(.666) (.693) (.035) (.009)
Wealth index (at age 1) 274.921 212.927 59.262 334.004***
(46.253) (72.223) (136.076) (108.217)
Wealth index2 (at age 1) 78.239 2.534 239.833 2326.216***
(51.615) (88.090) (135.841) (117.557)
Height-for-age z-score 1.725 7.007** 7.067** 8.483**
(3.480) (3.117) (3.443) (3.556)This content downloade
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First, enrollment in childcare at age 1 signiﬁcantly lowers math and Vietnam-
ese scores (10% signiﬁcance level). This may reﬂect reduced parental contact
in early childhood. Second, there is a marginally signiﬁcant negative impact of
maternal stress or depression on math scores.TABLE 3 (Continued )
Vietnam Peru
Math Score Vietnamese Score Math Score Spanish Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time spent in preschool (hours per
day in a “normal” week) 2.937 2.807 .575 23.282
(2.124) (2.019) (2.468) (1.997)
Only child (dummy) 27.804 2.601 2.364 2.783
(6.765) (4.683) (8.130) (8.863)
Household size 21.119 24.472*** 2.439 1.489
(1.869) (1.652) (1.949) (1.990)
Log per capital real consumption
(in local currency) 2.237 3.103 4.643 6.650
(6.725) (6.754) (8.267) (6.866)
Area of land owned (hectares) 21.729 .126 1.960** 2.702
(2.500) (2.360) (.900) (1.039)
Constant 253.384*** 301.134*** 290.666*** 235.264***
(76.393) (87.763) (103.405) (84.032)
School ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,129 1,129 547 54724 Some of these variables may be endoge
ing school ﬁxed effects. To check this w
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height for age at age 5 has positive impacts on bothmath and reading, although
signiﬁcantly so for the latter only. Household size at age 5 has a negative im-
pact; this suggests that additional siblings reduce resources and parental atten-
tion for the child, but it is signiﬁcant only for reading skills.
In Peru (table 3 cols. 3 and 4), the PPVTand CDA scores again have gen-
erally signiﬁcantly positive effects onmath and reading scores. Boys have higher
math skills and lower reading skills, yet unlike for Vietnam neither effect is sig-
niﬁcant. Ethnic minority children have slightly lower math and reading scores
but not signiﬁcantly so. As in Vietnam, parental education matters even after
controlling for preschool skills, but only mother’s education is signiﬁcant.
Peruvian children enrolled in childcare at age 1 scored lower on both tests,
and the large impact on Spanish skills (20.25 standard deviations) is signiﬁcant.
Unlike in Vietnam, the wealth index has a signiﬁcantly positive but diminishing
impact on Spanish scores but not math scores. As in Vietnam, nutritional status
at age 5 has a signiﬁcantly positive impact. Finally, land ownership has a signif-
icantly positive effect but only on math skills.
B. Differences in School Impacts by Advantaged Status
The vs parameters in equation (3) indicate whether the impacts of school and
teacher characteristics on learning are, on average, larger for advantaged chil-
dren. Columns 1 and 2 of table 4 present estimates of the average vs, the dif-
ference between the average school ﬁxed effects of advantaged and disadvan-
taged children, for Vietnam for ﬁve deﬁnitions of advantage. The average vs is
weighted by the number of younger cohort children in each school. The stan-
dard errors for these averages are calculated using the standard formula for the
variance of a linear combination of estimated parameters from a regression
(see, e.g., the discussion of eq. [5-17] in Greene 2012, 119).25
The estimated means of vs reveal little evidence that the average school im-
pact in Vietnam varies between advantaged and disadvantaged children. For all
but one deﬁnition, the estimated averages of vs are statistically insigniﬁcant.
The exception is when advantage is deﬁned as being male: Vietnamese schools
convey a sizable disadvantage to being male. That is, the average impact of
schooling on boys’math scores is 12.7 points (0.13 standard deviations) lower
than for girls, a difference signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and 29.9 points (0.30 stan-25 Note that the joint signiﬁcance of the school ﬁxed effects, separately for advantaged and disadvan-
taged children, is very high for all deﬁnitions of advantage, for both Vietnam and Peru (not shown in
table 4); this indicates that schools vary substantially in their contribution to children’s acquisition of
cognitive skills.
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-arddeviations) lower on the Vietnamese test, a difference signiﬁcant at the 1%
vel, even after controlling for age 5 test scores. This is surprising, because
t age 5 boys outperform girls on both cognitive tests (table 1).26 Figure 1A
hows the distribution (over schools) of vs (on the left) as well as the (separate)
istributions of boys’ and girls’ school ﬁxed effects. The difference in the values
f the ﬁxed effects v for math scores occurs mostly in the middle and upper
ange of those distributions, while for Vietnamese it is at all points in the dis-
ributions.
Overall, we ﬁnd no evidence that schools in Vietnam are more effective for
dvantaged children; the means of vs are close to zero. Indeed, the only signif-lTABLE 4
DIFFERENCES IN SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS BY ADVANTAGE GROUP: MEAN INCREMENTAL EFFECT, vs
Vietnam Peru
Math Score Vietnamese Score Math Score Spanish Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Being richer (top 2 wealth quintiles) 28.11
(7.42)
23.55
(6.89)
10.31
(10.79)
1.87
(12.29)
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) 9.12
(9.63)
11.10
(9.72)
19.98
(14.76)
38.12**
(17.04)
Being male 212.69**
(5.09)
229.88***
(4.88)
7.52
(6.67)
25.47
(7.19)
Being an ethnic majority 24.56**
(9.68)
22.05*
(11.79)
Having a mother with at least
primary education 28.98
(11.45)
214.22
(10.96)
214.31
(17.85)
2.01
(19.56)
Having not been malnourished in infancy 4.81
(9.11)
26.76
(7.72)
1.33
(9.14)
14.36
(11.76)Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The mean incremental effect of school on test scores of ad
vantaged children compared to disadvantaged children is vs, as shown in eq. (3). It is the mean value of the
coefﬁcients for the interaction of school ﬁxed effects with each of the advantage categories. All models
control for the full set of nonschool child, parent, and household characteristics shown in table 3. Math
and verbal scores were transformed using Item Response Theory; whole sample mean5 500, standard de
viation5 100. Being richer: wealth quintiles are constructed using awealth index that is a simple average o
three individual indexes ranging from 0 to 1, including housing quality (rooms per person, ﬂoor and roo
quality), consumer durables (mean of ownership of radio, bicycle, TV, car/truck, motorbike/scooter, land
line telephone, bed/table), and access to services (electricity; piped water into dwelling/yard; access to
own pit latrine/ﬂush toilet; cooking fuel is electricity, gas, or kerosene). Beingmore able: the Cognitive De
velopment Assessment (CDA) measures children’s perceptions of quantity—testing understanding of con
cepts such as few,most, half, many, equal, and pair. Being an ethnicmajority: Peru—mother’s ﬁrst language
is Spanish (i.e., not Quechua, Aymara, other). Not being malnourished in infancy: deﬁned using anthropo
metric indicator of adequate long-term growth (height-for-age z-scores > 22).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.edu/t-and-c).
720 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eicant effect is that Vietnamese schools seem to be more effective at increasing
the learning of girls, who are often considered disadvantaged, especially in
math (e.g., Fryer and Levitt 2010).
In contrast, the results for Peru, in table 4 columns 3 and 4, show differences
in school ﬁxed effects between advantaged and disadvantaged children when
advantaged is deﬁned in terms of preschool skills or in terms of ethnicity.When
advantage is deﬁned in terms of children’s preschool skills (CDA scores at
age 5), schools in Peru seem to be more effective for better prepared childrenFigure 1. Distribution of estimated v parameters for selected deﬁnitions of advantage. A, Vietnam by gender; B,
Peru by being more able; C, Peru by ethnicity. Color version available as an online enhancement.This content downloaded from 128.041.061.025 on July 07, 2017 06:51:37 AM
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tions).27 The estimated average vs is also large (20.0), but not quite signiﬁcant,
for math. Figure 1B shows that the difference in estimated school ﬁxed effects
for math scores occurs mostly in the lower and middle of the distributions of
those ﬁxed effects, while for Spanish the distributions differ at almost all points.
Unlike in Vietnam, schools in Peru are not more effective for girls than for
boys, or vice versa, in either math or reading. There is also no evidence of non-
school differences between boys and girls at age 5 (see table 1). Yet schools in
Peru appear to contribute more to learning for ethnic majority children. Even
after controlling for age 5 skills, nutritional status, and parental education (and
all other variables in table 3), the impact of school and teacher characteristics
on ethnic majority children’s math skills is 24.6 points (0.25 standard devia-
tions) higher than their impact on ethnic minority children; the analogous
differential impact for Spanish skills is 22.1 (0.22 standard deviations). Both
differences are statistically signiﬁcant.28 Note that this does not reﬂect some
type of higher innate ability for ethnic majority children; as explained in foot-
note 18, after conditioning on income, nutritional status, parental education,
and preschool attendance, there are no signiﬁcant differences in test scores by
ethnicity at age 5.
Figure 1C shows that the difference in the values of v for math is mani-
fested in a long lower tail for ethnic minority children but not for ethnic ma-
jority children; for Spanish there is a similar, although less clear, pattern. One
could argue that unobserved child or household factors explain this difference
(i.e., that these estimated differences in school effects are biased upward), yet
it is difﬁcult to imagine mechanisms for such bias.29
Finally, table 4 also shows, as in Vietnam, no signiﬁcant differences in
school impacts between children in Peru with less educated mothers and those
with more educated mothers, as well as no signiﬁcant difference by children’s
nutritional status in early childhood. Overall, even after controlling for a large27 This does not reﬂect that such children had better Spanish skills at age 5, as those skills are in the
control variables (the PPVT score).
28 A plausible alternative explanation for this difference could be that parents of children from ethnic
majority backgrounds invest more into supporting their children through school, through both time
and material investments, than parents of ethnic minority children. While we cannot rule out this
mechanism, we do not ﬁnd evidence to support it; speciﬁcally, when we add a control for household
educational expenditure at age 10, the difference in school effectiveness between ethnic minority and
majority children remains signiﬁcant and, if anything, increases.
29 Consistent with this, controlling for household, parent, and child characteristics, including pre-
school test scores, we ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant association between ethnicity and household
educational expenditure at age 5.
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higher skills at age 5 and not being an ethnic minority, advantaged children in
Peru learn more than disadvantaged children who attend the same schools.
This is in stark contrast with Vietnam, where advantaged children never ap-
pear to learn more than disadvantaged children in the same school and for one
advantage type (male) appear to learn less.
VIII. Robustness Checks and an Extension
This section checks the robustness of our results and presents some evidence
on the role of parental investments in explaining the gap between advantaged
and disadvantaged children.
A. Omitted-Variable Bias
As discussed in Section VI, despite using an extensive set of controls for non-
school inputs, including test scores at age 5, omitted-variable bias remains a
concern. To explore this, we assess the sensitivity of the main estimates to dif-
ferent assumptions about omitted variables.We compare three sets of estimates:
(1) main model (i.e., combining current and lagged inputs with lagged skill
scores), (2) using only lagged skill scores to capture all lagged inputs and innate
ability, and (3) controlling only for current and lagged observed inputs. If the
main results are driven by omitted-variable bias, they are likely to be sensitive to
different assumptions about omitted variables and so should vary noticeably
across these three models.
Table 5 shows the three sets of estimates for Vietnam and Peru for the types
of disadvantage with signiﬁcant differences: gender for Vietnam and preschool
cognitive skills and ethnicity in Peru. Estimates of vs for Vietnam when advan-
tage is deﬁned as being male are very stable across the three speciﬁcations for
both math and Vietnamese. Turning to Peru, when advantage is deﬁned as
skills at age 5, estimates of vs across the three models are very stable for Spanish
and reasonably stable for math. When advantage is deﬁned as being from the
ethnic majority group, estimates of vs are very stable for math skills, although
there is more ﬂuctuation for Spanish scores (estimates of vs range between
16.9 and 31.1). Overall, for all advantage categories in which we ﬁnd signif-
icant differences in school effects, the consistency of the direction and in most
cases size and statistical signiﬁcance of estimates of vs yield little evidence of
omitted-variable bias.
B. Sample Restrictions
Another plausible source of bias is selection of the analysis subsamples. First,
as explained in Section V, the school survey subsample for Vietnam includesThis content downloaded from 128.041.061.025 on July 07, 2017 06:51:37 AM
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year. In contrast, the Peru school survey sample is a subsample of the Young
Lives children in grades 3, 4, and 5. Estimates using the Vietnam school sur-
vey subsample may be biased if the children excluded from that subsample
are more likely to be disadvantaged (e.g., grade repeaters). Indeed, the data sup-
port this; unlike, Peru, the children included in the Vietnam school survey sub-
sample are on average better off than those in the full VietnamYoung Lives sam-
ple (see table A5).
To check whether our main ﬁndings are driven by this selection, we rees-
timated them using the full sample of children and test scores from the lastTABLE 5
SENSITIVITY OF THE ESTIMATED SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS
BY ADVANTAGE GROUP: MEAN INCREMENTAL EFFECT, vs
Vietnam Peru
Math Score Vietnamese Score Math Score Spanish Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1:
Being male 212.69**
(5.09)
229.88***
(4.88)
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) 19.98
(14.76)
38.12**
(17.04)
Being an ethnic majority 24.56**
(9.68)
22.05*
(11.79)
Model 2:
Being male 213.63***
(5.05)
231.39***
(4.95)
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) 29.10*
(15.48)
41.37***
(15.90)
Being an ethnic majority 26.61***
(9.15)
31.07***
(8.74)
Model 3:
Being male 29.98**
(5.09)
226.61***
(4.95)
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) 19.95**
(8.40)
33.14***
(9.75)
Being an ethnic majority 22.21**
(9.73)
16.88
(11.36)This content downloade
All use subject to University of Chicago d from 128.041.061.025 on July 
Press Terms and Conditions (http07, 2017 06:5
://www.journNote. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The mean incremental effect of school on test scores of ad-
vantaged children compared to disadvantaged is vs , as shown in eq. (3). Model 1: main model (estimates
reproduced for convenience)—controlling for all nonschool child, parent, and household characteristics
shown in table 3. Model 2: controls for age 5 cognitive test scores only. Model 3: controls for age 1
and 5 child, parent, and household characteristics, excluding age 5 cognitive test scores. Math and verbal
scores were transformed using Item Response Theory; whole sample mean 5 500, standard deviation 5
100. Being more able: the Cognitive Development Assessment (CDA) measures children’s perceptions of
quantity—testing understanding of concepts such as few, most, half, many, equal, and pair. Being an eth-
nic majority: Peru—mother’s ﬁrst language is Spanish (i.e., not Quechua, Aymara, other).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
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724 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eavailable round of the main Young Lives survey (round 3).30 Table 6 reveals no
systematic differences between the two sets of estimates.31 For math, the signs
are the same for three of the ﬁve types of advantage, and in the two cases withTABLE 6
COMPARING MAIN RESULTS TO ESTIMATES USING HOUSEHOLD SURVEY TESTS AND
SAMPLE IN VIETNAM: MEAN INCREMENTAL EFFECT, vs
Math Score
(School Survey)
Math Score
(Household Survey)
Vietnamese Score
(School Survey)
Early Grade Reading
Assessment Score
(Household Survey)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Being richer (top 2 wealth
quintiles) 28.11
(7.42)
2.38
(.77)
23.55
(6.89)
2.07
(.84)
Being more able (top 2
CDA quintiles) 9.12
(9.63)
2.80
(1.03)
11.10
(9.72)
2.31
(1.11)
Being male 212.69**
(5.09)
2.50
(.58)
229.88***
(4.88)
22.30***
(.61)
Having a mother with at
least primary education 28.98
(11.45)
.86
(1.21)
214.22
(10.96)
22.56*
(1.36)
Having not been malnour-
ished in infancy 4.81
(9.11)
1.76**
(.82)
26.76
(7.72)
2.81
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Glewwe, Krutikova, and Rolleston 725different signs neither estimate is statistically signiﬁcant. In the two cases in
which one estimate is signiﬁcant and the other is not, the signs are the same,
and in one case the signiﬁcant result is for the school survey subsample and
in the other case it is for the household sample. For reading, the signs are again
the same for three of the ﬁve deﬁnitions of advantage, and in the two cases with
different signs both estimates are insigniﬁcant. For the sole case when both
samples ﬁnd a signiﬁcant differential, they agree: boys appear to be at a disad-
vantage relative to girls. Thus, we conclude that excluding grade 3 and 4 stu-
dents in the Vietnam school survey does not lead to systematic biases.
A second sample restriction is inclusion of only those schools with both ad-
vantaged and disadvantaged children in the school survey subsample. Selec-
tion into these schools may differ across these two types of children.32 For ex-
ample, among children from richer households, those in the same schools as
children from poorer families, rather than elite schools, may be the less able or
less motivated among the richer children, while the reverse may hold for stu-
dents in those schools from poorer households. While possible, the insensitiv-
ity of our estimates to different assumptions about omitted-variable bias sug-
gests that this is unlikely to drive the main results.
Third, the results may be sensitive to differences in the sample for different
deﬁnitions of advantage, which occur because the estimates require at least one
advantaged and one disadvantaged child in each school, so the analysis samples
vary slightly for different types of advantage.33 To address this for Vietnam,
we constructed a “master sample” of 38 schools with 822 children that are
in the sample for all deﬁnitions of advantage; estimates of differences in school
effects between more and less advantaged children for this sample are very
similar to the main estimates, although less precise. For Peru, the smaller school
sample rules out a general “master sample” (it would have only 96 children in
six schools), so we focused on a somewhat larger sample for which each school
had (at least) one child with relatively low skills at age 5, one with relatively
high age 5 skills, one with a relatively uneducated mother, and one with an ed-
ucated mother. Again, we found similar, although very imprecise, results. De-
tails for both countries are available on request.
Finally, sample restrictions may limit the external validity of our ﬁndings. If
schools with both advantaged and disadvantaged children are atypical, our re-
sults may hold only for a small subset of schools in each country. To check this,32 Recall that all unobservables affecting both groups are differenced out, as vs is the difference in
school ﬁxed effects.
33 For example, the subsample of children in schools that have both more and less wealthy children
from the school survey sample is different from the subsample in schools that have both ethnic ma-
jority and minority children.
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726 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Etables 7 and 8 show, by country, several school characteristics for the whole
sample and the “overlap subsamples” (schools with both types of children),
with asterisks indicating signiﬁcant differences between whole sample and sub-
sample means. For Vietnam, the results show almost no signiﬁcant differences
for all deﬁnitions of advantage. Yet some differences emerge for Peru; this is
unsurprising since, on average, the Peru sample has fewer children per school
than the Vietnam sample, so fewer Peru schools have both advantaged and dis-TABLE 7
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOLS IN VIETNAM IN THE WHOLE SAMPLE AND SCHOOLS
IN THE ANALYSIS OVERLAP SUBSAMPLES
Overlap Subsamples
All Wealth Ability Sex
Maternal
Education
Malnutrition
in Infancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
School assets index .00
(1.64)
.33
(1.36)
.25
(1.59)
.26
(1.57)
.29
(1.46)
.07
(1.45)
School size (number of students) 481.73
(347.04)
535.81
(387.28)
533.77
(387.38)
502.63
(367.53)
501.75
(375.76)
445.71
(196.72)
School offers free full-day schooling .24
(.43)
.17
(.38)
.13
(.34)
.25
(.44)
.23
(.43)
.26
(.44)
School offers free lunch .88
(.33)
.91
(.28)
.83
(.38)
.87
(.34)
.88
(.04)
.90
(.30)
Principal: years of experience 10.78
(7.08)
10.91
(7.27)
10.10
(6.98)
10.76
(7.35)
10.15
(7.10)
10.48
(6.83)
Teacher: years of experience 17.58
(6.37)
17.10
(6.26)
16.68
(5.39)
17.81
(6.33)
17.88
(6.45)
17.49
(6.72)
Teacher: score on Vietnamese
pedagogy test 70.27
(12.23)
69.97
(13.10)
71.17
(13.57)
70.68
(12.96)
70.13
(12.79)
71.57
(11.18)
Teacher: score on math
pedagogy test 68.84
(8.44)
68.30
(6.74)
70.61
(8.32)
68.93
(8.34)
67.90
(7.89)
68.38
(7.38)
Pupils: mean number of days
absent (per month) 1.94
(6.82)
1.57
(6.51)
2.52
(8.16)
2.18
(.84)
2.46
(8.18)
1.94
(7.53)
Pupils: proportion ethnic minority .26
(.37)
.09***
(.19)
.12**
(.24)
.19
(.31)
.16*
(.28)
.20
(.32)
Pupils: proportion of grade repeaters .05
(.05)
.04
(.04)
.04
(.05)
.05
(.06)
.05
(.05)
.05
(.05)
Number of schools 90 48 61 77 61 63This content downl
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of more educated mothers; col. 6, children who were not malnourished in infancy. See table 4 note for
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Glewwe, Krutikova, and Rolleston 727advantaged children. Indeed, schools in the overlap samples are larger than in
the overall sample. The subsample most different from the main sample is the
schools with both wealthier and poorer children. They are larger, with more
assets and fewer ethnic minority pupils and grade repeaters. To the extent that
these are “above average” schools, the external validity of the results for this
type of advantage may be lower. Overall, however, other than school size there
is little systematic selection of schools into the overlap samples, especially forTABLE 8
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOLS IN PERU IN THE WHOLE SAMPLE AND SCHOOLS
IN THE ANALYSIS OVERLAP SUBSAMPLES
Overlap Subsamples
All Wealth Ability Sex Ethnicity
Maternal
Education
Malnutrition
in Infancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
School assets index .00
(1.74)
1.33***
(1.47)
.52
(1.83)
.28
(1.88)
.27
(1.76)
2.27
(1.70)
2.09
(1.89)
School size (number
of students) 378.0
(398.6)
785.9***
(444.4)
553.7***
(449.2)
491.1
(456.9)
557.7**
(504.4)
417.3
(413.3)
410.3
(415.1)
School private .14
(.35)
.08
(.28)
.11
(.31)
.10
(.30)
.04
(.20)
.00***
(.00)
.06*
(.23)
School offers free lunch .66
(.48)
.58
(.50)
.62
(.49)
.67
(.48)
.80
(.41)
.71
(.46)
.72
(.45)
Principal: years of experience 12.14
(8.67)
13.6
(9.37)
11.66
(8.06)
11.76
(8.34)
9.92
(7.40)
11.57
(8.40)
11.81
(8.12)
Teacher: years of experience 17.23
(7.69)
19.52
(6.40)
18.05
(7.22)
18.92
(7.05)
18.57
(6.32)
19.59*
(6.34)
17.81
(7.38)
Teacher: score on math
pedagogy test 7.74
(2.02)
8.23
(1.44)
7.62
(2.15)
7.57
(2.08)
7.99
(1.42)
7.25
(2.35)
7.67
(2.38)
Pupils: mean number of
days absent (per week) .47
(1.06)
.30
(.47)
.31
(.47)
.43
(.76)
.36
(.50)
.50
(.86)
.45
(.79)
Pupils: proportion ethnic
minority .19
(.32)
.05**
(.11)
.15
(.29)
.17
(.30)
.08
(.17)
.21
(.32)
.22
(.34)
Pupils: proportion of grade
repeaters .26
(.29)
.14***
(.13)
.19
(.18)
.22
(.19)
.23
(.19)
.24
(.16)
.27
(.21)
Number of schools 132 36 47 63 25 48 54This content
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in school effectiveness.
C. Advantage Category Cutoffs
We also checked whether our results hold when different cutoffs (50th and
70th percentiles) are used to deﬁne advantage by wealth and preschool skills.
The main results are unchanged (results available on request). In Vietnam, ir-
respective of the cutoff the results suggest that schools are equally effective at
teaching children from more and less advantaged backgrounds. In Peru, the
three different cutoffs (lowest 50%, 60%, and 70%) yield the persistent ﬁnd-
ing that schools are more effective for children with higher preschool skills.
D. Role of Parental Investment
This article focuses on the impacts of teachers and schools on learning and
whether they differ for advantaged and disadvantaged children in the same
school. Yet the data can also shed light on parental behavior. One approach is
to remove from X all parental choice variables—child size at birth, child health
(mother’s assessment), use of childcare, maternal stress/depression, household
wealth, height for age, skills at age 5, time in preschool, only-child status, house-
hold size, per capita consumption, and land owned—keeping only child age,
sex, and ethnicity and parental education. Estimates of vs from this speciﬁca-
tion will be biased if parental behavior is correlated with a particular type of
advantage. For example, parents of disadvantaged children may be discouraged
and so not enroll their children in preschool, which would lead to overesti-
mation of vs; alternatively, such parents may do more to help their children,
leading to underestimates of vs. Of course, such bias could vary by the type of
advantage.
Table 9 presents estimates of table 4 after removing parental choices from
X. For most types of advantage, the average estimated within-school differen-
tial in learning between advantaged and disadvantaged students barely changes.
Yet there are two exceptions. First, for both countries the average difference in
school ﬁxed effects (vs) increases sharply for advantage deﬁned by nutrition in
infancy. This implies that parents of well-nourished children take other actions
to raise their children’s learning, so not controlling for parental behavior will
overestimate the difference in school ﬁxed effects between advantaged and dis-
advantaged students.
Second, deﬁning advantage in terms of skills at age 5, the insigniﬁcant dif-
ference in ﬁxed effects between advantaged and disadvantaged children in
Vietnam becomes large and signiﬁcant. This suggests that Vietnamese parents
make additional educational investments in their “high-ability” children, andThis content downloaded from 128.041.061.025 on July 07, 2017 06:51:37 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE 9
MEAN INCREMENTAL EFFECTS WITH AND WITHOUT CONTROLS FOR PARENTAL INVESTMENTS:
MEAN INCREMENTAL EFFECT, vs
Vietnam Peru
Math Score Vietnamese Score Math Score Spanish Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1:
Being richer (top 2 wealth quintiles) 28.11
(7.42)
23.55
(6.89)
10.60
(10.63)
2.47
(12.44)
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) 9.12
(9.63)
11.10
(9.72)
19.83
(14.80)
38.32**
(17.12)
Being male 212.69**
(5.09)
229.88***
(4.88)
7.58
(6.75)
24.39
(7.07)
Being an ethnic majority 24.30**
(9.67)
20.39*
(11.76)
Having a mother with at least completed
primary schooling 28.98
(11.45)
214.22
(10.96)
214.08
(17.79)
1.30
(19.24)
Having not beenmalnourished in infancy 4.81
(9.11)
26.76
(7.72)
1.40
(9.24)
13.55
(11.79)
Model 2:
Being richer (top 2 wealth quintiles) 21.81
(6.62)
1.96
(6.23)
8.99
(8.05)
6.05
(9.91)
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) 21.18***
(6.22)
21.79***
(5.92)
19.64**
(8.09)
35.10***
(9.95)
Being male 29.94**
(5.01)
226.32***
(4.97)
7.06
(6.77)
26.50
(7.14)
Being an ethnic majority 19.26**
(9.36)
14.88
(15.63)
Having a mother with at least completed
primary schooling 218.01
(11.18)
223.70**
(10.97)
210.10
(17.58)
27.33
(20.62)
Having not beenmalnourished in infancy 7.84
(7.79)
8.52
(6.32)
9.01
(11.13)
23.38**
(9.34)This content downloaded
All use subject to University of Chicago P from 128.041.061.025 on July 
ress Terms and Conditions (http07, 2017 06:5
://www.journNote. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The mean incremental effect of school on test scores of ad-
vantaged children compared to disadvantaged children is vs , as shown in eq. (3). Model 1: main model
(reproduced for convenience). Model 2: excludes controls for parental inputs, includes controls for sex,
age, ethnicity, parental education only (Peru only: grade at the time of the test). Math and verbal scores
were transformed using Item Response Theory; whole sample mean5 500, standard deviation5 100. Be-
ing richer: wealth quintiles are constructed using a wealth index that is a simple average of three individual
indexes ranging from 0 to 1, including housing quality (rooms per person, ﬂoor and roof quality), consumer
durables (mean of ownership of radio, bicycle, TV, car/truck, motorbike/scooter, landline telephone, bed/
table), and access to services (electricity; piped water into dwelling/yard; access to own pit latrine/ﬂush
toilet; cooking fuel is electricity, gas, or kerosene). Being more able: the Cognitive Development Assess-
ment (CDA) measures children’s perceptions of quantity—testing understanding of concepts such as few,
most, half, many, equal, and pair. Being an ethnic majority: Peru—mother’s ﬁrst language is Spanish (i.e.,
not Quechua, Aymara, other). Not being malnourished in infancy: deﬁned using anthropometric indicator
of adequate long-term growth (height-for-age z-scores > 22).
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.1:37 AM
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teachers or schools are more effective for advantaged students.
IX. Conclusion
Students in many developing countries learn far less than their counterparts in
developed countries, and within developing countries some children learn
much more than others. This article considers whether schools in Vietnam
and Peru reinforce or reduce gaps in learning between advantaged and disad-
vantaged students for six different types of advantage by estimating separate
school ﬁxed effects for advantaged and disadvantaged students. This focuses
on intra- rather than interschool differences in schools’ contribution to learn-
ing among different types of students.
We estimate school ﬁxed effects for advantaged and disadvantaged children,
controlling for a variety of child and household characteristics, including cog-
nitive skill tests at age 5 (before starting primary school). We ﬁnd no evidence
that schools in Vietnam are more effective for advantaged students. Indeed,
the one signiﬁcant effect is that girls, who some consider disadvantaged, pull
ahead of boys between age 5 and 10. In contrast, for two deﬁnitions of disad-
vantage schools in Peru appear to be more effective for advantaged students:
those with higher skills at age 5 acquire more Spanish skills than do less pre-
pared students, and ethnic majority students learn more math and Spanish
than minority students, even after controlling for skills at age 5.
These ﬁndings conform with existing evidence on differences between the
school systems of Vietnam and Peru. Vietnam’s expansion in primary educa-
tion in the last 2 decades included effective investment in education quality
and a focus on equity, emphasizing that all pupils attain “minimum standards.”
In contrast, Peru’s schools suffer from low average quality and high inequality
in student learning, with evidence of gaps in access and learning outcomes by,
for example, income and ethnicity. Our results show that such gaps exist even
among students attending the same school; more advantaged pupils learn more
than less advantaged pupils, even after controlling for many pupil characteris-
tics, including skills at age 5.
This article does not explore the mechanisms behind these effects, yet the
recent literature on within-school discrimination against disadvantaged groups
and biases in school curriculum in favor of advantaged children in several con-
texts offers potential explanations.Classroomobservations to seewhether teach-
ers discriminate against disadvantaged children should be a high priority. Yet
one conclusion is clear: estimates that assume that schools have the same im-
pacts on different types of students may overlook a major source of inequality
in student learning in developing countries.This content downloaded from 128.041.061.025 on July 07, 2017 06:51:37 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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TABLE A3
INDIVIDUAL AND SCHOOL SAMPLE SIZES IN OVERLAP GROUP IN EACH OF THE
ADVANTAGE-DISADVANTAGE CATEGORIES
Vietnam Peru
Children
(1)
Schools
(2)
Children
(3)
Schools
(4)
Richer 420
(474)
48 175
(219)
36
Poorer 510
(655)
127
(328)
More able 346
(357)
61 144
(178)
47
Less able 660
(772)
223
(369)
Male 568
(578)
77 212
(263)
63
Female 540
(551)
232
(284)
Ethnic majority . . . . . . 128
(198)
25
Ethnic minority . . . 90
(349)
More educated mother 816
(921)
61 235
(309)
48
Less educated mother 185
(208)
145
(238)
Not malnourished in infancy 775
(900)
63 264
(410)
54
Malnourished in infancy 217
(229)
120
(137)This content downlo
All use subject to University of Chica733
aded from 128.041.061.025 on July 
go Press Terms and Conditions (http07, 2017 06:51:37 A
://www.journals.ucNote. Overlap group at the child level (cols. 1, 3) includes children who are in schools that have both ad-
vantaged and disadvantaged children for each deﬁnition of advantage. Overlap group at the school level
(cols. 2, 4) includes all the schools in the sample that have both advantaged and disadvantaged children
for each deﬁnition of advantage. Total number of children in each of the advantage and disadvantage
groups is in parentheses. See table 4 note for details on how each category is measured.M
hicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE A4
TESTS FOR EQUALITY OF NONSCHOOL VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS IN EQUATION (3)
ACROSS ADVANTAGED AND DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN
Vietnamese Spanish
Advantage Indicator Math Score Vietnamese Score Math Score Spanish Score
Being richer (top 2 wealth quintiles) 1.22
(.21)
1.49*
(.053)
1.09
(.25)
.55
(.97)
Being more able (top 2 CDA quintiles) .87
(.65)
1.28
(.16)
1.08
(.36)
1.26
(.18)
Being male .74
(.83)
.87
(.65)
1.40
(.092)
1.32
(.13)
Being an ethnic majority . . . . . . 1.56*
(.06)
1.98***
(.01)
Having a mother with at least
completed primary schooling 1.30
(.15)
1.36
(.11)
1.49*
(.07)
1.34
(.13)
Having not been malnourished in infancy 1.55**
(.04)
1.28
(.15)
3.91***
(.00)
3.22***
(.00)This content downloade
All use subject to University of Chicago P734
d from 128.041.061.025 on July 
ress Terms and Conditions (http07, 2017 06:5
://www.journNote. F-test statistics and p-values in parentheses for tests of joint signiﬁcance of interactions of non-
school variables with each of the advantage indicators used in the main analysis. See table 3 for complete
set of nonschool variables and details of how they are measured. See table 4 note for details on how each
advantage category is measured. CDA 5 Cognitive Development Assessment.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.1:37 AM
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